

## Message Text

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SUBJ: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 23, 1974  
(SALT TWO -478)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY  
MINISTER SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF OCTOBER 23, 1974.

QUOTE

SEMENOV STATEMENT, OCTOBER 23, 1974

PROCEEDING FROM THE TASK OF SEEKING WAYS TO IMPLEMENT  
THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT OF MAY 26, 1972  
MUST BE FOLLOWED BY A NEW AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE USSR AND  
U.S. ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS, IN THE COURSE OF  
PAST MEETINGS THE USSR DELEGATION HAD SET FORTH A NUMBER  
OF IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS OF THE SOVIET SIDE.

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TODAY WE INTEND TO CONTINUE SETTING FORTH THE POSITION ON THE QUESTION OF BANNING THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WHICH WAS DEALT WITH IN THE STATEMENT OF THE USSR DELEGATION OF OCTOBER 1, 1974.

I

IT IS OBVIOUS THAT ACHIEVEMENT OF AN UNDERSTANDING ON BANNING NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE IN TERMS OF ACCOMPLISHING THE TASK OF WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985. CORRESPONDING OBLIGATIONS BY THE SIDES WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY ENHANCE BOTH THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LIMITATIONS PROVIDED FOR THEREIN. INDEED LIMITING SOME TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WHILE LEAVING OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF DEVELOPING OTHER, NEW TYPES OF SUCH ARMS, WOULD MEAN THAT THE AGREEMENT COULD POTENTIALLY BE CIRCUMVENTED; THIS WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE GOALS AND TASKS OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS.

THE U.S. SIDE HAS NOTED THAT THE AGREEMENT TIME FRAME OF THE NEW AGREEMENT--UNTIL 1985-- CONSTITUTES A PERIOD OVER WHICH BOTH SIDES CAN FORECAST TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENTS. IN THE CONNECTION WE WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT, DURING THE PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION, OF THE NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MENTIONED, WOULD IN PRINCIPLE APPEAR TO BE QUITE REALISTIC.

HOWEVER, NOW, WHILE THESE NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS HAVE NOT YET BEEN DEVELOPED, THERE ARE FAVORABLE OPPORTUNITIES TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO BAN THEM. IT IS UNREASONABLE NOT TO MAKE USE OF THESE OPPORTUNITIES IN WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT.

THE ABSENCE OF A CORRESPONDING UNDERSTANDING ON BANNING THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF THESE TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD LEAVE OPEN A CHANNEL FOR CONTINUING COMPETITION IN THE ARMS RACE. THERE IS A REAL  
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DANGER THAT, UNLESS THE SIDES REACH AN UNDERSTANDING ON BANNING SUCH WEAPONS, IT IS PRECISELY HERE, IN THE AREA OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, THAT THE " ACTION-REACTION" CYCLE MENTIONED BY THE U.S. DELEGATION MIGHT MANIFEST ITSELF.

WE ARE DISCUSSING AN AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD ALSO NOT DISREGARD THE FACT THAT

THE APPEARANCE OF THE TYPES OF WEAPONS ENUMERATED EARLIER, IN THE EVENT THAT THE SIDES WERE NOT TO BAN THEIR DEVELOPMENT, TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT, WOULD LEAD TO EXPANDING THE ASSORTMENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WHICH WOULD LESSEN THE VALUE OF THE MEASURES LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS UNDER THE AGREEMENT.

II

IN THIS ITS STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 15, 1974 THE USSR DELEGATION EMPHASIZED IN PARTICULAR, THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF THE SIDES ASSUMING OBLIGATIONS TO BAN THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF FIXED AND MOBILE DEVICES FOR LAUNCHING BALLISTIC MISSILES, WHICH COULD BE EMPLACED ON THE SEABED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR AND IN THE SUBSOIL THEREOF, INCLUDING THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND INLAND WATERS. THIS MEASURE, AMONG OTHER THINGS, WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY ALSO HAVE A WIDE INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE, PARTICULARLY IN TERMS OF STRENGTHENING THE 1971 TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE EMPLACEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ON THE SEABED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR AND IN THE SUBSOIL THEREOF, WHICH BOTH OF OUR STATES ARE PARTIES.

THE SOVIET SIDE ALSO PROPOSED CONSIDERATION OF THE QUESTION OF ASSUMING OBLIGATIONS NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY STRATEGIC BALLISTIC MISSILES ON AIR-BORNE PLATFORMS AND WATER-BORNE VEHICLES (OTHER THAN SUBMARINES). INDEED, IF THE POSSIBILITY OF DEVELOPING AND DEPLOYING SUCH TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WERE PERMITTED, THIS WOULD MEAN NONE OTHER THAN A BUILD-UP IN THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE FACT THAT SUCH LAUNCHERS WOULD NOT BE LOCATED ON LAND OR ON SUBMARINES WOULD NOT CHANGE THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MATTER.

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IN ITS STATEMENTS THE USSR DELEGATION SUBSTANTIATED THE PROPOSAL FOR THE SIDES TO ASSUME OBLIGATIONS TO BAN THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF LONG-RANGE AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES, IT BEING UNDERSTOOD THAT SUCH MISSILES WOULD INCLUDE MISSILES WITH A RANGE EXCEEDING 600 KILOMETER. IN PARTICULAR, IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT LEAVING OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF ARMING STRATEGIC BOMBERS WITH SUCH MISSILES WOULD LEAVE OPEN A CHANNEL FOR COMPETITION IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN A NEW AREA. BANNING LONG-RANGE AIR-TO SURFACE MISSILES WOULD THUS ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LIMITATIONS WITH RESPECT TO STRATEGIC BOMBERS.

OF GREAT IMPORTANCE IN TERMS OF LIMITING AND HALTING

THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS RACE IN EEW AREAS WOULD BE THE BANNING OF THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING AND DELPOYMENT OF INTERCONTINENTAL CRUISE MISSILES. MISSILES OF SUCH A TYPE, HAVING AN INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE. CAN BE USED FOR DELIVER-ING NUCLEAR STRIKES ON TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE, REGARDLESS OF THE PLACE AND TYPE OF THEIR DELOPY-MENT. DEVELOPMENT OF THIS KIND OF MISSILE WOULD MEAN THE APPEARANCE OF YET ANOTHER TYPE OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPON, AND THIS WOULD POTENTIALLY ENTAIL THE POSSIBILITY OF CONTINUING THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS RACE WHICH THE ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS ARE CALLED UPON TO LIMIT AND RESERVE.

NOR CAN WE IGNORE SUCH A POSSIBLE CHANNEL FOR THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS RACE AS THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF SEA-BASED STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES. AS ALREADY NOTED BY THE USSR DELEGATION, SEA-BASED STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES INCLUDE SUCH MISSILES WITH A RANGE EXCEEDING 600 KILOMETERS. UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS, MISSILES OF THIS TYPE COULD STRIKE TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE, I.E. CARRY OUT THE SAME KIND OF MISSIONS AS OTHER TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

COMPETITION IN DEVELOPING SEA-BASED STRATEGIC CRUISE MISSILES WITH ARANGE EXCEEDING 600 KILOMETERS WOULD, IF PERMITTED, BE CLEARLY CONTRARY TO THE TASKS OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

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THE USSR DELEGATION DEEMS IT NECESSARY TO EMPHASIZE ONCE AGAIN THE OBLIGATIONS TO BAN THE NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MENTIONED WOULD APPLY TO BOTH SIDES AND OF COURSE, THERE IS NO NEED TO PROVE THAT BOTH SIDES ARE EQUALLY INTERESTED IN THE ASUUMPTION OF SUCH OBLIGA-TIONS.

### III

WITH REFERENCE TO THE TASK OF WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985, THE U.S. DELEGATION, AT THE OCTOBER 8 MEETING, SPOKE OF ITS READINESS TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF "NEW SYSTEMS". PROGRESS AT OUT NEGOTIA-TIONS COULD BE SERVED IF THE U.S. DELEGATION WERE TO SET FORTH SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS ADDRESSED BY THE USSR DELEGATION.

AT THE NEXT MEETING THE USSR DELAGATION INTENDS TO CONTINUE SETTING FORTH ITS CONSIDERATIONS ON SOME OTHER ASPECTS OF THIS QUESTION.  
UNQUOTE JOHNSON

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